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DeepSeek, a rising CCP AI company, was under siege. The company’s official statement, issued in careful, bureaucratic phrasing, spoke of an orchestrated “distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack” aimed at crippling its systems. A grave and urgent matter, to be sure. Yet, for those who had followed the firm’s meteoric rise, there was reason for skepticism

DeepSeek had, until this moment, presented itself as a leader in artificial intelligence, one of the few entities capable of standing alongside Western firms in the increasingly cutthroat race for dominance in machine learning. It was a firm backed, either openly or in whispered speculation, by the unseen hand of the Chinese state. The company’s servers, housed in mainland China, were reportedly fueled by NVIDIA H800 GPUs, their interconnections optimized through NVLink and InfiniBand. A formidable setup, at least on paper

But then came the curious measures. Whole swaths of IP addresses, particularly from the United States, were unceremoniously blocked. The platform’s registration doors were slammed shut. And in the vague, elliptical style of official Chinese pronouncements, the public was assured that these were emergency steps to preserve service stability. What the company did not say—what they could not say—was that these actions bore all the hallmarks of a hasty retreat, rather than a tactical defense

For a true DDoS attack—one launched by sophisticated adversaries—there were measures to mitigate it. Content delivery networks. Traffic filtering. Rate-limiting techniques refined over decades by those who had fought in the trenches of cybersecurity. Yet DeepSeek’s response was not one of resilience, but of restriction. They were not filtering the bad actors; they were sealing themselves off from the world

A theory began to take shape among industry watchers. If DeepSeek had overestimated its own technological prowess, if its infrastructure was ill-prepared for rapid growth, the sudden influx of new users might have looked, to their own internal systems, like an attack. And if the company was not merely a commercial enterprise but an entity with deeper ties—perhaps to sectors of the Chinese government—it would not do to admit such failings publicly. To confess that their AI could not scale, that their systems could not bear the weight of global interest, would be an unpardonable humiliation.

The consequences of such a revelation would be severe. The markets had already felt the tremors of cyberattacks; the global economy had bled $1.5 trillion due to disruptions of this nature. If DeepSeek, a firm hailed as the vanguard of China’s AI ambitions, was faltering under its own weight, the financial and political repercussions would extend far beyond the walls of its server farms. The illusion of invulnerability had to be maintained

Thus, the narrative of a “DDoS attack” was not merely convenient—it was necessary. It allowed DeepSeek to take drastic action while obscuring the truth. Blocking foreign IPs? A countermeasure against cyber threats. Suspending new users? A precaution against infiltration. A firm whose technological backbone was more fragile than its reputation suggested had suddenly found an excuse to withdraw from scrutiny under the guise of self-defense

It is in such moments that history leaves its telltale fingerprints. The annals of technological development are filled with entities that stumbled not due to sabotage, but due to their own shortcomings, concealed under layers of propaganda and misdirection. One wonders if, years from now, when the documents are unsealed and the real story emerges, historians will look back at DeepSeek’s so-called DDoS crisis not as an act of foreign aggression—but as a moment of revelation, when the cracks in the edifice became too great to hide

Also, the DeepSeek app has been removed from both Apple’s App Store and Google’s Play Store in Italy. This action occurred after Italy’s data protection authority, known as the Garante, requested information from DeepSeek regarding its handling of personal data. Users attempting to access the app in Italy received messages indicating that it was “currently not available in the country or area you are in” on Apple’s App Store and that the download “was not supported” on Google’s platform. As reported by REUTERS.CO

Regarding Ireland, the Irish Data Protection Commission has also reached out to DeepSeek, seeking details about how it processes data related to Irish users. However, as of now, there is no confirmation that the app has been removed from app stores in Ireland. As reported by THEGUARDIAN.COM

Currently there is no publicly available information indicating that DeepSeek has specifically blocked access from Apple, Google, or individual reporters’ servers. It’s possible that access issues could be related to the broader measures DeepSeek has implemented in response to recent events, but without specific details, it’s difficult to determine the exact cause.

For now, the truth remains elusive, hidden behind digital firewalls and the careful hand of censorship. But as in all such cases, history is patient. It waits for those who will dig deeper, who will look beyond the official statements and ask: Was it an attack? Or was it something else entirely?

Story By Skeeter Wesinger

January 30, 2025

 

In a move that has set the cybersecurity world on alert, Palo Alto Networks has sounded the alarm on a significant security flaw in their Expedition tool, a platform designed to streamline the migration of firewall configurations to their proprietary PAN-OS. This vulnerability, codified as CVE-2024-5910, underscores the critical importance of authentication protocols in safeguarding digital boundaries. The flaw itself—a missing authentication mechanism—permits attackers with mere network access the alarming ability to reset administrator credentials, effectively opening the gate to unauthorized access and potentially compromising configuration secrets, credentials, and sensitive data that lie at the heart of an organization’s digital defenses.

The gravity of this flaw is underscored by the immediate attention of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which has not only added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog but also issued a direct mandate: all federal agencies must address this vulnerability by November 28, 2024. The urgency of this deadline signifies more than just bureaucratic efficiency; it speaks to the alarming nature of a vulnerability that CISA reports is being exploited in the wild, thus shifting this issue from a theoretical risk to an active threat.

Palo Alto Networks has responded with characteristic clarity, outlining a series of robust security measures to mitigate this vulnerability. They emphasize restricting the PAN-OS management interface to trusted internal IP addresses, advising against exposure to the open internet. In addition, they recommend isolating the management interface within a dedicated VLAN, further securing communications through SSH and HTTPS. These measures, while straightforward, demand a high level of attention to detail in implementation—an effort that could very well mean the difference between a fortified system and a compromised one.

Meanwhile, in a strategic pivot, Palo Alto Networks has announced that the core functionalities of Expedition will soon be integrated into new offerings, marking the end of Expedition support as of January 2025. The shift signals a broader evolution within the company’s ecosystem, perhaps heralding more advanced, integrated solutions that can preemptively address vulnerabilities before they surface.

The directive to apply patches and adhere to the recommended security configurations is not just sound advice; it is, as security expert Wesinger noted, a necessary defensive measure in a rapidly shifting landscape where the stability of one’s systems rests on the relentless vigilance of their custodians. The events unfolding around CVE-2024-5910 are a reminder that in cybersecurity, as in any theater of conflict, complacency remains the greatest vulnerability.

By Skeeter Wesinger

November 14, 2024

 

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/new-front-cybersecurity-exposed-skeeter-wesinger-rjypf

In my recent blog post (The Zero-Day Exploit), I delved into the ominous specter of a zero-day attack—a modern battleground where every line of code could become a weapon. Now, deep within the shadowed corridors of Washington’s security apparatus, federal authorities confront an unsettling truth: cyber operatives, believed to act under Beijing’s influence, have executed an unprecedented infiltration of the communications of high-profile American political figures. Among those targeted are former President Donald Trump, Senator JD Vance, and members closely tied to Vice President Kamala Harris’ presidential campaign—a campaign of cyber subterfuge seemingly directed against the core of American political discourse.

The scale and specifics of this alleged intrusion remain cloaked in the vague ambiguity of covert operations. Yet, all indicators point to a highly calculated strike aimed at nothing less than the integrity of the American electoral process itself. Investigators privy to the case describe the attackers as well-armed with advanced tools, reportedly leveraging zero-day vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities, hidden within layers of code and unknown even to the most vigilant defenders, are invaluable assets in the field of cyber warfare. For Beijing, exploiting these cracks in the American defenses would yield them enormous strategic leverage—enabling them to breach layers of security with the ease and precision of a master locksmith bypassing a barricade.

As I observe this case unfolding, I see no cause for surprise. The People’s Republic has invested heavily in cyber warfare capabilities for years, honing a formidable presence in telecommunications and other critical infrastructures. According to intelligence reports, Chinese hackers may have used telecom networks to track targets, gaining access to sensitive communications through devastating stealth. Their operations, intricate and multi-faceted, have likely combined zero-day exploits with human-engineered social manipulations, tactics from the Living off the Land playbook, and a unique synthesis of psychological acumen with digital force.

The response by campaign officials and security specialists is nothing short of urgent. Fully aware now of their compromised defenses, they are preparing for a strenuous purge. Their task is formidable: conducting rigorous vulnerability assessments, dividing networks, and deploying advanced endpoint monitoring—all part of an intensive strategy to weed out any lingering remnants of this stealthy invasion. And yet, it is clear that we stand on the precipice of a new Cold War—this time, with China. It’s high time that the United States rises to the challenge with every tool at its disposal.

This tale is still unfolding, a cascade of questions yet unanswered, yet one troubling truth looms ever larger: in an age of encrypted data and fortified networks, even the most vigilant defenses can be laid bare, one zero-day at a time.

Story by

By Skeeter Wesinger

October 26, 2024

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/federal-authorities-believe-group-cybercriminals-backed-wesinger-hot2e